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Abstract
Background: Intravenous potassium chloride (IV KCl) solutions are widely used in hospitals for treatment of
hypokalemia. As ampoules of concentrated KCL must be diluted before use, critical incidents have been associated
with its preparation and administration. Currently, we have introduced ready-to-use diluted KCl infusion solutions to
minimize the use of high-alert concentrated KCl. Since this process may be associated with considerable risks, we
embraced a proactive hazard analysis as a tool to implement a change in high-alert drug usage in a hospital setting.
Methods: Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a systematic tool to analyze and identify risks in system
operations. We used FMEA to examine the hazards associated with the implementation of the ready-to-use solutions. A
multidisciplinary team analyzed the risks by identifying failure modes, conducting a hazard analysis and calculating the
criticality index (CI) for each failure mode. A 1-day survey was performed as an evaluation step after a trial run period of
approximately 4 months.
Results: Six major possible risks were identified. The most severe risks were prioritized and specific recommendations
were formulated. Out of 28 patients receiving IV KCl on the day of the survey, 22 received the ready-to-use solutions
and 6 received the concentrated solutions as instructed. Only 1 patient received inappropriate ready-to-use KCl.
Conclusions: Using the FMEA tool in our study has proven once again that by creating a gradient of severity of
potential vulnerable elements, we are able to proactively promote safer and more efficient processes in health care
systems. This article presents a utilization of this method for implementing a change in hospital policy regarding the
routine use of IV KCl.
Keywords: FMEA, Failure mode and effect analysis, Potassium chloride, Quality management, General methodology,
Hospital care, Qualitative methods
Background
During the last decade, many Israeli hospitals have
joined an accreditation process in order to receive the
prestigious quality approval certificate from the Joint
Commission International (JCI). This approval confirms
that all the medical activities in the hospital are carried
out in a safe and coordinated manner and on the basis
of the most up-to-date medical guidelines and know-
ledge available. The accreditation process thoroughly
examines different aspects of the hospital’s activities fo-
cusing on International Patient Safety Goals (IPSG).
IPSG address areas of concern related to patient safety.
High-alert drugs constitute one these major areas.
Assaf Harofeh Medical Center is one of Israel’s largest
tertiary medical centers, with over 800 acute care beds.
It serves a population of over 500,000 in central Israel.
The hospital provides all the major services including:
emergency, intensive care, general medical, surgical,
cardiac, pediatric, neonatal, gynecological and obstetrical
medical services. Up to recently, concentrated KCl
solutions (14.9 %) were supplied to all hospital wards as
part of the routine weekly order. These concentrated
solutions were stored in separate cupboards away from
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other solutions and medications and marked with a spe-
cial sticker indicating that they are high-alert drugs. The
nurses prepared the solution for infusion according to
doctors’ orders by inserting the required dose of KCl
into the appropriate infusion solution bag (saline, glu-
cose 5 % etc.).
Potassium chloride (KCl) is an electrolyte most com-
monly used for potassium replacement in various clinical
conditions related to hypokalemia (low potassium levels).
KCl administration via the intravenous (IV) route should
only be used when the oral or enteral route is not possible
or will not achieve the required increase in serum potas-
sium within a clinically acceptable time [1–3]. Since severe
hypokalemia (<2.5 mEq/L) may result in muscle necrosis
and cardiac arrhythmias, concentrated KCl IV solutions
are widely used and administered as diluted solutions
to treat this condition. These patients may require
rapid infusion of IV KCl. A delay in administering
this therapy could compromise patient care and result
in cardiac arrest [4]. However, these concentrated
solutions can be fatal if given inappropriately. Con-
centrated KCI has been identified as a highrisk medi-
cation by organizations in Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (UK). In the United States of America, 10 pa-
tient deaths from misadministration of concentrated
KCl solution were reported to the Joint Commission
in just the first 2 years of its sentinel event reporting
programme: 1996–1997. In Canada, 23 incidents in-
volving KCl misadministration occurred between 1993
and 1996 [5–9].
According to a new policy, all hospital wards are now
being supplied with commercial “ready-to-use” diluted
KCl solutions, which are available in three different con-
centrations [10]. Concentrated KCl solutions are re-
stricted to the pharmacy and to those critical care areas
where concentrated solutions are needed for urgent use
such as the Intensive Care Unit, the Cardiac Care Unit
and other nominated departments. KCl concentrated so-
lutions have been removed from the routine stock in all
other wards and clinical departments.
In emergency cases of severe hypokalemia and in other
instances such as heart failure requiring administration
of bolus doses, these wards receive concentrated KCl so-
lutions from the pharmacy by personal prescription.
Since the hospital pharmacy is not staffed on a 24-h
basis, a stock of concentrated KCl is also kept in one of
the critical care departments so that it is available to the
departments during off-pharmacy hours.
The purpose of this switch was to reduce the potential
risk of accidental overdose of IV KCl arising from the
use of KCl concentrated solutions by prescribing and
using (whenever possible) commercially available ready-
to-use diluted solutions, save valuable nursing time, and
to ensure that patients requiring IV KCl as part of their
treatment continue to receive it promptly and safely.
Switching to KCL dilution solutions is a new national
trend emerging in parallel at various hospitals. Several
considerations brought us to the decision to choose the
FMEA methodology out of a variety of risk assessment
methodologies. Firstly, the hospital demanded a prompt
assimilation (roughly, in 2 months’ time) of the change.
Secondly, since we were dealing with a high alert
medication, we looked for a methodology that focuses
on systematic identification of the potential risks, priori-
tizing them and preparing a preventative program in
parallel to executing the innovative changes in practice.
The FMEA methodology supplied a reasonable solution
for the outlined requirements. As different medical cen-
ters adopted distinct methodologies and due to lack of
accumulative experience in the Israeli healthcare system,
we chose a process that enabled us to identify risks and
proactively address them before causing any potential
harm. The goal of our work was to present a process of
risk management as a step toward developing safer hos-
pital policy. The aim of this paper is to present the usage
of the FMEA methodology as an advanced tool to
achieve this policy. It is worthwhile to emphasize that
the FMEA methodology enabled us to make an easy and
smooth implementation of a change associated with a
high alert drug therapy. In a 4-month time period, most
of the physicians and nurses underwent an abrupt
change in their therapeutic perception by abandoning a
long term and very flexible routine use of KCL solutions
and began adhering instead to a strict regimen of only 5
ready to use KCL solutions. Moreover, this transition
was implemented without causing any harm to even one
single patient.
Methods
Failure model effect analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a systematic technique for failure analysis.
Using this tool enables the systematic analysis of postu-
lated component failures and the identification of the re-
sultant effects on system operations [11–13].
FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability
study. It involves reviewing as many components, as-
semblies, and subsystems as possible to identify failure
modes, and their potential harm (causes and effects). For
each component, the failure modes and their resulting
effects on the rest of the system are recorded on a spe-
cific FMEA worksheet. The FMEA approach also en-
ables each of the elements comprising a process under
investigation to be attributed a cumulative numerical
value, the risk priority number (RPN), which can be used
to prioritize the action to be taken because it is a numer-
ical rating of the severity, probability and detectability of
each failure mode [11–13].
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Conducting the FMEA [14–16]
Step 1: selecting the process
Step 2: establishing a multidisciplinary action team
In February 2014, a multidisciplinary team including
nurses, a pharmacist, physicians, a risk manager, a
quality assurance representative and an administrator,
gathered in order to analyze the risks of implementing a
new policy of using ready-to-use diluted KCl solutions.
The team was led by the Deputy Director of the Medical
Center.
Step 3: mapping the process
After reviewing the current situation, the team identified
failure points associated with the implementation of
ready-to-use diluted KCl solution, suggested an algo-
rithm and linked a consecutive number to each process
step (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Flowchart of the administration of KCL
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Step 4: targeting and listing the possible failure modes
The team identified failure modes associated with the
implementation of ready-to-use diluted KCl solutions.
The causes of each failure were determined and their
impact on patients and/or the organization was defined
(Table 1).
Step 5: prioritization of the failure modes
Each member of the team conducted and estimated a
hazard analysis by prioritizing the failure modes. We
prioritized the failure modes identified by using FSP
ranking scales:
1. Frequency of occurrence (F)
2. Severity of effects (S)
3. Probability of detection (P).
The product of the amplification of these three scores
is the RPN, which represent an index for hazard identifi-
cation for those modes that pose the greatest potential
risks (a higher value represents a greater risk). We de-
cided to initially address the highest rated failure modes
and established a “cut–off” RPN value of 300. Table 2
presents all the failure modes identified correlated with
their RPN values. The six failure modes chosen and
addressed are highlighted in the table. Solutions to the
failure modes with the highest ranking may be also be
solutions for the less significant failure modes.
Step 6: development of action plans
The team suggested strategies and developed action
plans to be implemented in order to cope with the
emerging highest failure modes. The improvement plan
is detailed in Table 2. In view of the recommendations
suggested, we wrote a protocol for appropriate potas-
sium supplementation use, and distributed it throughout
the hospital. We also needed to apply ongoing training
of nurses, physicians and pharmacists. This training
focused on safety and prevention of potential hazards
related to KCl solutions usage.
Table 1 Possible failure modes associated with ready-to-use diluted IV KCl solutions
No Failure mode Cause of failure Effect of failure
1 Error in recorded doctor’s instructions: dose
or dosing rate
Inflexibility of the medical staff in adopting
new practices
Error in KCL administration due to dose or
rate miscalculation
2 Errors in doctor’s instructions documented
in medical record: dose or dosing rate
Medical staff fixation on familiar pattern of
dosage regimen
Administration of wrong KCL dose
3 Lack of knowledge regarding new and
unfamiliar solutions.
Availability of various new and unfamiliar
solutions.
Erroneous administration of unsuitable
solution.
4 The available new diluted KCL solutions do
not meet the patient’s needs and
characteristics
KCL solution choice is not one of the
3-standard concentration options
Administration of KCL dose that is
unsuitable for the patient
5 The solution vehicle is inappropriate. The
infusion itself is incorrect for the patient
Availability of only 2 standard solution
vehicles.
Administration of KCL solution that is
inappropriate for the patient.
6 The infusion itself is inappropriate for the
patient
Lack of ready-to-use KCL solutions in saline
0.45
Administration of KCL solution that is
inappropriate for the patient
7 The solution vehicle is inappropriate. The
infusion solution itself is inappropriate for
the clinical condition of the patient
Ready-to-use dextrose-based solutions may
aggravate hyperglycemia in patients on
regular diets
Risk of hyperglycemia.
8 The solution vehicle is inappropriate. The
infusion solution itself is inappropriate for
the patients clinical condition
The new solution may be contraindicated in
certain medical conditions
May cause hypernatremia, elevated blood
volume, elevated blood pressure and
pulmonary edema in patients with fluid
restrictions such as those with cardiac and
renal insufficiency
9 The solution vehicle is inappropriate. The
infusion solution itself is inappropriate for
the clinical condition of the patient
Not every solution is appropriate for
correction of severe clinical conditions
(i.e., treatment of acute severe hypokalemia)
The patient’s emergency status is corrected
too slowly
10 Staff is unfamiliar with storage instructions
of new solutions
Choice of a broad variety of solutions stored Solution administration error: administration
of a solution without, instead of with, KCL,
and vice versa
11 Staff is unfamiliar with storage instructions
of new solutions
KCL solutions must be stored separately
from non-KCL solutions
Delay in administering the required
treatment
12 Lack of knowledge regarding new and
unfamiliar solutions
Lack of special handling instructions Delay in identifying clinical deterioration.
13 Lack of uniform policy regarding administration
and frequency of treatment
Lack of policy for use of new solutions Variation between the various departments
in the quality of treatment
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In emergency situations, when high doses of potas-
sium had to be promptly administered at a high rate in a
minimum volume, the physician provided the pharmacy
with a personal prescription for concentrated KCl solu-
tion, which was supplied to the department as soon as
possible. The pharmaceutical services also took a signifi-
cant role in this procedure by assessing the extent of
KCL solution usage of each department and ensuring
adequate supplies. In addition, the risk management unit
published a warning regarding the use of glucose based
KCL solutions in diabetic patients.
The final stage of this FMEA methodology was an
evaluation process to examine and validate the imple-
mentation of an overall policy, to encourage the use of
the ready-to-use commercial solution over the trad-
itional practice.
The evaluation step actually constitutes the conclusive
step (step 7) of the FMEA process. Following the imple-
mentation of action plans, we sought to look for a mea-
sureable method to evaluate the procedure effectiveness.
The use of KCl ampoules and ready-to-use solutions
post system change was evaluated. As part of the
ongoing audit procedure, a periodic (every 3–4 months)
1-day survey was carried out in order to investigate the
extent of implementation and adherence to the prede-
fined guidelines for the correct use of the new solutions.
This survey sampled 326 patients from medical, surgery,
pediatric and intensive care departments. Twenty-eight
patients (8.6 %) were intravenously treated with KCl
solutions (of any kind).
Results
FMEA methodology was used to assess the riskiness of
each element of the process.
Ranking
The failure modes for each element were evaluated and
ranked according to risk impact and the six primary
risks were predefined by the “cut–off” RPN value of 300.
Table 2 Scoring the failure modes by FSP ranking scales







Inflexibility of the medical staff to
adopt new practices
10 4 3 120
Medical staff fixation on familiar
dosage regimen
9 4 1 36
Availability of various new and
unfamiliar solutions
10 5 3 150
KCL solution choice options are
limited to only 3 concentrations
9 5 9 405 In emergency situations, when high doses of KCL
are needed, the pharmacy will supply solutions
containing KCL according to the doctor’s prescription
(mEq/100 ml (custom-made medication)
Availability of only 2 types of
solution mediums
10 5 9 450 In emergency situations, when high doses of KCL
are needed, the pharmacy will supply solutions
containing KCL according to the doctor’s
prescription (mEq/100 ml)
Lack of pre-prepared KCL
solutions in saline 0.45 %
2 5 9 90
The new solution may be
contraindicated in certain
medical conditions
10 6 10 600 In emergency situations, when high doses of KCL
are needed, the pharmacy will supply solutions
containing KCL according to the doctor’s prescription
(mEq/100 ml) (custom-made medication)
The solutions are unsuitable for
treating acute severe
hypokalemia
9 4 9 324 In cases of acute severe hypokalemia, the pharmacy
will supply concentrated KCL solutions according to
the doctor’s prescription (mEq/100 ml)
A broad variety of solutions in
the storage area
4 5 9 324 The pharmacy will distribute precise storage orders
KCL solutions must be stored
separately from non KCL
solutions
9 8 2 144
Lack of special handling
instructions
7 5 2 70
Lack of new policy for using the
new solutions
10 4 2 80
Abbreviations: FSP frequency of occurrence (F), severity of effects (S), probability of detection (P), RPN risk priority number
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The uppermost impact risk failure modes highlighted
in Table 2 are:
1. The new solution may be contraindicated in certain
medical conditions.
2. The ready-to-use KCl solutions are only available in
normal saline (0.9 %) or in saline 0.45 % + glucose
5 % solutions, which might not always be compatible
with the patient’s condition.
3. Ready-to-use dextrose solutions may aggravate
hyperglycemia in diabetic patients having regular
diets.
4. Ready-to-use solutions are only available in three
specific concentrations of KCL.
5. The available concentrations are not suitable for
treating acute severe hypokalemia.
6. Storing a broad variety of new solutions in the
medicine cabinet may confuse the staff and cause
errors upon choosing the right solution.
Validation
Our observation during the 1-day survey showed that 6
patients out of 28 (21.4 %) were treated with ready-to-
use solutions and 22 patients (78.6 %) received tailored
personalized prescriptions of KCl solutions (dilution of
concentrated KCl solutions) as assessed by their phys-
ician. Only 1 patient (3.6 %) out of the 28 treated did
not receive the appropriate solution according to the
predefined criteria.
Policy making
Following the FMEA process, survey results and evi-
dence based medicine, hospital guidelines were formu-
lated and published hospital wide.
Discussion
Medication errors are a huge challenge for many players
in the hospital area: clinicians, pharmacists and medical
administrators. Historically, KCl solutions were self-
prepared and custom-made, mainly due to the high cost
involved with the switch. In this article, we describe the
FMEA methodology as a smart tool to implement a new
policy. The advantages of FMEA as a risk management
methodology enable policy makers to identify hazards as
a step towards developing safer hospital strategy.
Switching to KCL diluted commercial preparations is a
new national trend. As different medical centers em-
braced their own best practice distinct methodologies,
our rationale was to avoid the halo effect when imitating
others. Derived from the urge to avoid bias, our strategy
was to adopt an analytical methodology for intra- institu-
tional implementation relying on comprehensive consider-
ations of a group of experts within our organization.
FMEA as an analytical methodology enables in depth
inspection to reveal the roots of hazards and take steps
towards an acceptable strategy to balance patient safety,
effective pharmaceutical activity and economic manage-
ment. Ranking the different dimensions, the frequency
of occurrence, the severity of effects and the probability
of detection, clarified the possible loci of intervention
paving the way toward desirable directives and cement-
ing organizational policy. The cascade of methodology-
process-outcome is presented in Fig. 2. FMEA was used
to assess the consequences of implementing a process of
substituting concentrated KCl solution with ready-to-use
KCl solutions. Out of 13 selected possible failure modes
with the highest RPN, six critical major risks were iden-
tified. However, only three intervention strategies were
required to successfully overcome these obstacles. Using
FMEA methodology enabled us to lay out the potential
Fig 2 The cascade of methodology- process- outcome
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failure modes and focus on the most risky ones. Applying
method insights resulted in a remarkable organizational
attitude and practice shift towards a top safety level. Our
work, similarly to other studies using FMEA methodology
[15, 16], showed that FMEA prioritizes the potential
harms and minimizes riskiness of complex processes.
The purpose of the 1-day survey was to examine the
implementation of the new policy. The results showed
adherence to the recommended guidelines and prede-
fined standards in 96.4 % of the cases, supporting a good
implementation process, and were compatible with the
scoring as was expressed on the FMEA scales. The single
inappropriate infusion stated in the results section was
associated with a prescribed (out of habit) KCL solution
in a concentration the physician used to prescribe before
the reform. As a matter of fact, this concentration did
not exist amongst the 5 available solutions (though a
very similar one did exist). The nurse carried out the
written order, though in this specific event, there was no
indication to use a concentrated KCL solution at all.
One limitation in our study was that we measured the
adherence rates only once, approximately 4 months after
the policy implementation starting point. It would be
appropriate to examine the adherence to the guidelines
again in a 1 year.
Conclusions
Currently, there is a trend towards switching to commer-
cially diluted KCl solutions as a wise step to minimize the
rate of potential medication errors. Before the commence-
ment of the program, several adverse events were reported
in our institution. The implementation process has been
assessed for a 2-year period, and though the survey was
done once, up to date, no incident of adverse event has
been reported. This demonstrates clearly the adherence of
the medical staff to a presumably, well designed protocol.
Using FMEA methodology enables in-depth inspection
to reveal the roots of hazards and take steps towards an
acceptable strategy to improve patient safety, effective
pharmaceutical activity and economic management. It is
an effective proactive risk assessment tool to assist multi-
disciplinary groups in understanding a process, identifying
errors that may occur and reducing potential risks. We
have presented a utilization of this method for implement-
ing a change in the routine use of IV KCl. A safe and
smooth implementation may encourage us to use FMEA
as a universal and generic instrument in future projects at
our institution demanding risk minimization.
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